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The European Community ("EC") has achieved a degree of unity
within Europe.' There are differences among Member States, however,
that prevent them from deriving the optimal benefits of such a union.
2
Movements by groups both in and out of the EC have sought to mini-
mize these differences in order to create greater unity among the Mem-
ber States. The most notable of these attempts were the Action Com-
mittee for the United States of Europe in 1956, and a political
community proposed in 1963 .3 Recently, there have been several re-
newed attempts to further the goal of European unity, including a
Draft Treaty on European Union, an Action Committee for Europe
and the Dooge Committee report.
1. E. NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 3 (1985). The European Community consists of three regional organizations, the
European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community,, and
the European Economic Community. Id. The aim of the EC is to provide the means for
European unity, both economically and politically. Id.
2. The Member States are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and
Greece. Spain and Portugal joined in January 1986.
Problems within the EC are those inherently associated with the expanding member-
ship of the Community. Other problems are caused by the growing economic gap be-
tween rich and poor Member States. Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1985, at A1S, col. 1; see
also C. Ehlermann, How Flexible is Community Law? An Unusual Approach to the
Concept of Two Speeds, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1274 (1984) (discussing the debate among
EC Member States over the "two-speed" concept for development programs).
3. Gazzo, Action Committee for Europe Plans Push for Unity, EUROPE, Sept.-Oct.
1985, at 32. Jean Monnet headed the Action Committee for the United States of Eu-
rope in 1956; Paul-Henri Spaak led an ad hoc assembly proposing a political commu-
nity in 1963.
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A. DRAFT TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
In February 1984, the European Parliament adopted the Draft
Treaty on European Union.4 The treaty proposes broad institutional
and substantive reforms in the EC.' The principles of the Draft Treaty
represent a commitment to pluralist democracy, respect for human
rights, respect for EC law, promotion of international peace, and closer
unity within Europe.6
The Draft Treaty contains provisions for reshaping EC institutions.
7
One reform the treaty proposes is to grant the European Parliament
more power,8 thus elevating its role in relation to the Council of Europe
and entrusting the Parliament with more than merely an advisory func-
tion.9 Further, the Draft Treaty creates a type of bicameral legislative
process to replace the present EC system involving the issuance of di-
rectives, resolutions and recommendations.1" Additionally, the Draft
Treaty proposes strengthening the European Monetary System. 1 Other
measures in the Draft Treaty involve social, political and foreign
policy. 12
Before the Draft Treaty can be implemented by the Member States,
it faces many political hurdles. These hurdles include constitutional
4. 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 234) 14 (1984); see Lodge, Freestone & Davidson,
Some Problems on the Draft Treaty on European Union, 9 EUR. L. REV. 387 (1984)
(discussing origins of the Draft Treaty).
5. See Jacques, The Draft Treaty: An Overview, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES: AN EVER CLOSER UNION 17-25 (1985) [hereinafter cited as AN EVER
CLOSER UNION] (giving an overview of the Draft Treaty).
6. Id. at 306 (listing principles of the Draft Treaty).
7. Draft Treaty, Part Three, Title I reprinted in AN EVER CLOSER UNION, supra
note 5, at 311-15. See AN EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 5, Annex I at 306-28
(citing a complete text of the Draft Treaty); see also E. NOEL, supra note I, at 3
(describing present EC institutions).
8. See Lodge, Freestone & Davidson, Some Problems on the Draft Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union, 9 EUR. L. REV. 387, 390 (1984) (detailing the legislative process pro-
posed by the Draft Treaty).
9. See E. NOEL, supra note 1, at 29-34 (detailing powers and functions of the Eu-
ropean Parliament).
10. See Lodge, Freestone & Davidson, Some Problems on The Draft Treaty on the
European Union, 9 EUR. L. REV. 387, 390 (1984) (describing the respective roles of
the European Parliament and Council of Europe under the Draft Treaty); see also J.
Louis, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 54-60 (1985) (listing different types of EC
legislation: the regulation, which has general application; the directive, which imposes
an obligation; the decision, which has individual application; and the opinion or recom-
mendation, which is not binding).
11. See Pinder, Economic and Social Powers of the European Union and the
Member States: Subordinate of Coordinate Relationship?, in AN EVER CLOSER
UNION, supra note 5, at 103-26 (describing economic powers of the EC under the
Draft Treaty).
12. See Bruckner, Foreign Affairs Powers and Policy in the Draft Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Union, in AN EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 5. at 127-40.
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problems within each Member State, as well as contradictions between
the Draft Treaty and EC treaties.1 3 Despite these problems, commenta-
tors emphasize the significance of the Draft Treaty as an expression of
the strong desire of the Member States for change within the EC. 1
B. THE DOOGE COMMITTEE
The Dooge Committee is an ad hoc Committee on Institutional Af-
fairs."8 The EC established the Committee to propose objectives, poli-
cies and institutional reforms in order to create a "genuine political
entity."1" The first objective the Committee suggested, in its report to
the Council in March 1985,17 was the creation of a homogeneous inter-
nal economic region."' This economic region requires the: establishment
of free movement of European citizens; creation of a favorable climate
for investment; adoption of European standards for goods; coordination
of customs; introduction of a common transport policy; allowance for
free movement of European capital; creation of a technical community
to take charge of vocational training and research and development;
and the strengthening of the European Monetary System. 10
Second, the Committee suggested promotion of common values20
such as protecting the environment, achieving an integrated European
social policy, and establishing greater cooperation in the enforcement
and codification of community law. The Committee also suggested pro-
moting the common cultural values of the Member States and people
of Europe. This promotion of common values would be accomplished
by such programs as safeguarding the European cultural heritage, en-
acting measures to overcome the language barriers, developing a new
European-wide news media, eliminating obstacles to free movement of
cultural goods, improving knowledge about other peoples of the Com-
13. See AN EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 5, at 161-285 (discussing constitu-
tional and political aspects of implementing the Draft Treaty in each Member State);
see also Lodge, Freestone & Davidson, Some Problems on the Draft Treaty on the
European Union, 9 EUR. L. REV. 387, 395 (1984) (discussing the compatibility of the
Draft Treaty with the EEC treaty).
14. See AN EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 5, at 8 (describing the Draft Treaty
as "the most ambitious effort so far to achieve sweeping institutional and substantive
reform in the European Communities. .. ").
15. 3 BULL EUR. Comm. point 3.5.1, at 102-11 (1985) (noting the interim report
by the Committee).
16. Id. at 102-03 (detailing the purpose of the Committee).
17. Id. at 102.
18. Id. at 103-05.
19. 3 BULL. EUR. CoiM. point 3.5.1, at 102, 103-05 (1985).
20. 3 BULL. EUR. Co~M. point 3.5.1, at 102, 105-06 (1985).
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munity, and intensifying exchange programs.
As a third objective, the Committee proposed the creation of an ex-
ternal identity for the European Community through the development
of an external policy.2 2 In initiating an external policy, security and
defense measures could be developed involving the participation of each
Member State.28 To achieve these objectives, the Committee suggested
changes to expedite the decisions-making process within the Council.
24
The Committee also recommended a strengthened Commission and a
greater role for the European Parliament.25 Finally, the Committee
stated the European Court of Justice must be given more prominence
and its binding decisions enforced, to assure that each Member State is
complying with Community law.26
C. THE ACTION COMMITTEE FOR EUROPE
The present Action Committee for Europe differs from the earlier
Action Committee for the United States of Europe.27 The present
Committee no longer uses the phrase "United States of Europe" as the
name for the ultimate goal of a unified Europe, because the Europeans
do not want to be closely identified with the United States of
America,28 but seek an independent identity.2 9 Furthermore, the new
Action Committee includes business and labor leaders among its
members.30
In June 1985, the Committee released a statement to the Council
that identified four areas for EC improvement:31 creation of a border-
free European home market by 199232 EC response to problems cre-
ated by advanced technology,3 strengthening of the European Mone-
21. id.
22. Id. at 106-08.
23. Id. at 107-08.
24. Id. at 108-10 (suggesting efficient, democratic institutions as the means to
achieve objectives).
25. 3 BULL. EUR. COMM. point 3.5.1, at 109-10 (1985) (setting forth the Commit-
tee's proposal for strengthening Commission and Parliament).
26. Id.
27. See Gazzo, Action Committee for Europe Plans Push for Unity, EUROPE,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 32-33 (describing differences between the old and new
Committees).




32. Id.; see also Lodge, Freestone & Davidson, Some Problems on the Draft
Treaty on European Union, 9 EuR. L. REv. 401 (1984) (commenting on the free
movement of capital between Member States under the EEC).
33. Gazzo, supra note 27, at 33.
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tary System8 4, and finally, the creation of a concerted policy among
Member States to promote better relations between regions separated
by an economic gap.
35
II. EMPLOYMENT ISSUES
A particular area of concern for the Member States of the European
Community is employment. Two aspects of employment that the Com-
munity discussed recently are unemployment and migration policy.
A. UNEMPLOYMENT
In April 1985, the Commission reported that 13.6 million Europeans,
approximately 11.6 percent of the work force, were unemployed during
1984.38 Five million of these persons were under 25 years of age, con-
stituting 39 percent of the total number unemployed.37
While there is substantial employee protection in the Member
States,38 Council action to combat unemployment has been limited. In
1985, the Council adopted a directive requiring EC action to combat
poverty. 9 The European Parliament, believing the Council measure in-
adequate, passed a series of resolutions calling for additional action0
The Parliament resolutions included a special employment program for
youth.41 The program involves vocational training and the creation of a
European-wide job market through the establishment of a uniform sys-
tem of recognition for diplomas and certifications.
42
To create an overall plan of employment, the Parliament stressed
that any policy must account for changes taking place in the overall
34. See Rey, The European Monetary System, 17 COMOtON MKT. L. REv. 7
(1980) (describing European Monetary System). See generally Ungcrer & Hurst, The
European Monetary System The Experience 1979-1982, IMF Occasional Paper No.
19 (May 1983) (describing problems of the European Monetary System).
35. Gazzo, supra note 27, at 33.
36. 4 BULL. EUR. Comm. point 2.1.4, at 27 (1985) (report adopted by the
Commission).
37. Id.
38. See generally Bellace, Employment Protection in the EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 413 (1984) (describing employee protection available in the EC).
39. See 28 0.. EuR. Comm. (No. L 2) 3 (1985) (discussing Council decision on
measures to combat poverty).
40. See 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 122) 54-68 (1985) (citing the complete text of
European Parliament resolutions on employment, including the ones summarized in
accompanying text).
41. See 28 0.. EuR. Comm. (No. C 122) 54 (1985) (noting Parliament's resolu-
tions concerning various employment programs).
42. See id. at 56 (measure calling for recognition of diplomas to give youth free-
dom of access in the EC job market).
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European market.43 The Parliament also considered the investment of
European Social Fund resources into local undertakings to create more
jobs." Finally, the Parliament's resolution called for the harmonization
of social security policies of all Member States and the safeguarding of
disadvantaged groups including the elderly, handicapped, migrant
workers, and homosexuals. 5 The resolution also reflected a special con-
cern that the Commission set priorities to protect women. 8
B. MIGRATION
Migrant workers are also an important factor to be considered in the
overall employment situation in Europe.47 In February 1985, the Com-
mission communicated its goals for migration policy to the Council.48
The Commission's communication stated that the European migration
policy is a vital part of progress toward European citizenship.40 Addi-
tionally, it pointed out that the EC, in moving toward European citi-
zenship, should remove all barriers to free movement of persons, adopt
better legal standards for the status of immigrants, and take measures
to remove obstacles to the equal treatment of immigrants8 0
In 1985, the Parliament adopted two reports on migration policy af-
ter much debate.51 One report expressed dissatisfaction with the Com-
mission's communication to the Council82 and proposed that host Mem-
ber States give immigrants the right to vote and stand for local
election." Furthermore, the report suggested that migrant workers be
allowed to return to their country of origin to vote in those elections .
4
Some members of Parliament objected to this report because it did not
43. See id. at 58 (describing Parliament's plan for handling unemployment and
establishing new priorities).
44. Id. at 59.
45. Id. at 67.
46. Id.; see also Duffy, Working Women Hurt by Recession, EUROPE, Sept.-Oct.
1985, at 26 (illustrating the vulnerability of women during the economic crisis in
Europe).
47. 4 BULL. EUR. COMM. point 2.4.5 at 61 (1985). A report in the European Parlia-
ment stated there are 17 million migrant workers living in the Member States. Id.
48. See 2 BULL. EUR. COMM. point 1.3.1 at 14-16 (1985) (noting Commission's
communication to the Council on migration policy).
49. Id. at 15; Evans, European Citizenship. A Novel Concept in EEC Law, 32 AM.
J. COMP. L. 679 (1984).
50. 2 BULL. EUR. COMM. point 1.3.1, at 14-16 (1985).
51. 4 BULL. EUR. COMM. point 2.4.5 at 61-64 (1985). One report was given by
Francesca Marino of Italy concerning the right to vote for immigrants and another was
given by Giovanni Papapietro of Italy on the education of migrant children. Id.
52. 4 BULL. EUR. COMM. point 2.4.5, at 61 (1985) (Marinaro Report).
53. Id. at 61-62.
54. Id. at 62.
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distinguish between Community migrant workers and non-Community
workers. 55 As one member pointed out, Community workers living in
non-Community states were not given voting rights in that host coun-
try.5 The report was adopted in May with some compromising amend-
ments including the right to vote in the country of residence for work-
ers who lived in a Member State for at least five years.
57
The second report concerned a 1977 directive on the education of
migrant workers' children. 58 The report stated that the directive was
being violated in many Member States5" and recommended that Parlia-
ment urge the Council to bring suit in the European Court of Justice
against any Member State violating the directive.10
Many members of Parliament have felt that the increasing rate of
unemployment in Member States has placed migrant workers in a vul-
nerable position.6" Thus, the Parliament suggested other measures in
their resolution to help migrant workers. 2 These measures included
calling for more effective coordination of national laws to combat ra-
cism and xenophobia, information campaigns for migrant workers, and
the establishment of institutions providing migrant workers with legal
assistance.6"
III. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATY REFORMED
On December 4, 1985" the ten core Member States of the European
Community voted to reform the Treaty of Rome,65 the instrument that
55. 4 BULL. EUR. COMM. point 2.4.5 at 61 (1985). A member of the European
Right attempted to have the report replaced by two separate reports. Id.
56. Id. Nicole Chouraqui of France cited the example of French technical coopera-
tion workers in Africa who were not allowed to vote by the host nation. Id.
57. See 28 O.J. EUR. CONMM. (No. C 141) 462 (1985) (printing complete text of
Parliament's resolution on migration policy).
58. See 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 6.8 (1977) (discussing directive requiring
Member States to allow immigrant children to attend public school).
59. See 4 BULL EUR. CoM. point 2.4.5, at 62 (1985) (printing Papapietro report
on application of Council directive).
60. Id.; see also J. Louis, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 27 (1985) (stating that
the task of the Court of Justice is to enforce directives in Member States).
61. Id. at 464; 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 141) 463 (1985) (Resolution of Parlia-
ment stating: "whereas the socio-economic crisis and the so-called third industrial
revolution have led to mass unemployment and the weakest social groups such as mi-
grant workers have suffered most").
62. Id. at 464-68.
63. Id.
64. Common Market Changes Get Approval, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1985, at A3, col.
4.
65. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, entered into force
January 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in OFFICE FOR THE OFFICIAL PUBLICA-
TIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TREATIES ESTABLISHING EUROPEAN COMMtU-
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created the Community. The ultimate goal of this institutional reform
was to enable the European Community to compete more effectively in
international trade with its major competitors, the United States and
Japan. The December 4th reforms are the first amendments to the
Treaty since its creation in 1957.8
At the Luxembourg Summit, the Intergovernmental Conference pro-
posed a compromise package which would improve the EC's decision-
making process and make its institutions more effective. The package
was structured to strengthen Europe's economy and pave the way to a
unified European Common Market 1 without trade barriers between
Member States blocking all progress toward a true common market. 8
During the Summit, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands led the ma-
jority, calling for greater cooperation among Member States and more
effective utilization of human and financial resources to support the Eu-
ropean Community's drive for economic sufficiency. The majority also
urged that concrete changes be made in the EC's institutions and pro-
cedures to assist the emergence of a politically and economically uni-
fied European Community. Among the suggested changes was a grant
of real power to the European Parliament to oversee the decision-mak-
ing process in the Community.6" Denmark and Britain, however, op-
posed these material reforms and agreed only to a minor strengthening
of the European Parliament's powers.70 The Council of Foreign Minis-
NITY 202 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
66. Although the EC was founded 27 years ago, no previous agreement to reform
the Treaty of Rome was reached prior to the Milan Summit in July 1985. At the
Milan Summit, an Intergovernmental Conference was established to begin revitalizing
the EC's institutions at a future summit in Luxembourg. During the Luxembourg
Summit, the Intergovernmental Conference indeed pursued this goal by updating the
EC's policies and procedures by making them more compatible with modern political
and economic realities. Conference on E.C. Reform Begins, 26 A Letter From Europe:
A Monthly Update on the European Community From its Delegation in Washington 2
(Oct. 21, 1985) (available in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washing-
ton, D.C.).
67. Common Market Changes Get Approval, supra note 64, at 5. The reforms,
including the abolishment of a unanimous vote requirement in favor of a majority vote,
should support the goal of increased efficiency and lead to a more unified European
Common Market by 1992. Id.
68. The Parliament estimates that the present system of national border-crossing
requirements in Western Europe costs fifty billion dollars a year, or about two percent
of the combined gross national product of EC Member States. European Community
Leaders Seek Greater Unity, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 5, 1985, at 16, col. 1.
69. Crossick, E.C. Conference Focuses on Reforms, EUROPE, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at
32. At present, the European Parliament is not a legislative body, nor does it have the
power to override EC Council decisions. Its formal opinions, however, are usually re-
quired prior to EC Council legislative action. Id.
70. See Common Market Changes Get Approval, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1985, at A3,
col. 4 (noting that the Parliament's advisory role was modestly increased, but EC lead-
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ters finally adopted these reforms at the December 16th meeting and
adopted the amended texts.
One of the material changes in European Communities institutional
procedure was a reform of the legislative process. Formerly, a unani-
mous decision was required to pass new legislation.7 1 Under the current
system, pursuant to amendments to this procedure made at the Luxem-
bourg Summit, only a qualified majority vote will be required to pass
proposed legislation. The new process values each nation's vote accord-
ing to the size of its population allowing a majority of votes to fulfill
the passing requirement. The revised system was intended to accelerate
the legislative process and to facilitate the entry of Spain and Portugal
into the European Community.7 2 European Community officials hope
that measures can now be passed that would have been delayed by op-
position from one or two Member States.7
IV. UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY'S AGRICULTURAL TRADE RELATIONS
Agricultural trade issues are a major source of controversy between
the United States and the European Community. Farming community
representatives in the United States and European Community agree
that substantial cooperation is necessary to prevent the outbreak of a
trade war.74 Increased cooperation between trading partners is essential
ers denied the Parliament power over EC decision-making); see also EEC Moves To-
ward New Integration, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 4, 1985, at 2D, col. I (discussing the vari-
ous reforms).
71. All major policy decisions required a unanimous vote by EC members. Each
Member State reserved the right to object to any decision affecting important national
interests and, ultimately, had the right to veto. This process was slow and inefficient, as
it often resulted in political stalemates on proposed legislation. E.C. Agrees to Reforms
in Treaty, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1985, at A29, col. 1; EEC Moves Toward New Integra-
tion, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 4, 1985, at 2D, col. 1.
72. EC officials anticipated a considerable slowdown in the legislative process upon
the accession of Spain and Portugal. There were fears that the additional national in-
terest groups could halt decision-making in the EC. The new voting procedure is in-
tended to increase the movement of blocked legislation and improve the EC's progres-
sion toward unification. EEC Moves Toward New Integration, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 4,
1985, at 2D, col. 1; Common Market Changes Get Approved, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1985 at A3, col. 4; see also Crossick, EC Conference Focuses on Reforms, EUROPE,
Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 32 (discussing the potential problems of the reforms).
73. EEC Moves Toward New Integration, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 4, 1985, at 2D, col.
1. Member States could oppose legislation that adversely affected their vital national
interests. The new qualified majority vote requirement should facilitate legislative acts
for the benefit of the EC and the Common Market.
74. Trade conflicts between the United States and the European Community con-
cerning agricultural products have recently escalated to dangerous dimensions. The
grain, citrus, pasta, and wine trade disputes have caused producers on both sides of the
Atlantic to fear an all-out trade war. European Information Service, Farm Trade: EEC
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to promote the goals of orderly international trade and balance supply
and demand for agricultural products.75 In an attempt to avoid detri-
mental confrontations, affected parties in the United States and the
European Community have agreed to participate in bilateral and multi-
lateral consultations to promote "orderly and mutually respectful trad-
ing of foodstuffs.17 6 This agreement was a result of the Conference on
Agriculture held in Texas on October 23, 1985. The conference was
hosted by the United States Chamber of Commerce and attended by
representatives of the Committee of Agricultural Organizations in the
European Community (COPA), the General Committee of Agricul-
tural Cooperation in the EEC (COCEGA),7 7 and U.S. farmers, pro-
ducers, and consumer organizations.78
The Conference' on Agriculture concluded that it was to improve
GATT rules governing agricultural trade in order to gain the respect of
GATT member nations and ameliorate trade tensions between the
United States and the European Community. Furthermore, dispute res-
olution procedures or required changes/amendments needed to be
changed to make the process more efficient and the exchange rate
among major world currencies would need to be set to enhance free
trade and create market stability. In addition, the Conference in-
sightfully noted that in adapting agricultural policies, increased consid-
eration should be given to the different economic and social conditions
prevailing in the United States and the European Community's agricul-
tural producing Member States.7 9
and U.S. Farmers' Representatives Seek Ways to Avoid Dangerous Trade War, Euro-
pean Report No. 1171, §111, at 5 (Oct. 30, 1985) (available in the European Commu-
nity Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as European Report No.
1171]; see also Nuzum, U.S.-EEC Back Away From Trade War, Wash. Post, Apr. 21,
1986, at 9C (discussing the increasing tension between the U.S. and the EC on the
issue of agricultural trade restrictions and the problems of food surpluses due to farm
subsidies on both sides).
75. U.S.-EEC Back Away From Trade War, supra note 74, at 9C. Balanced sup-
ply and demand for agricultural products would help solve severe surplus problems in
the United States and the European Community. The ability of farming sector organi-
zations to affect such a market change is doubtful. Cooperation between United States
and European Community farming sectors, however, is a productive step in the slow
progression toward improved trade relations. Id.
76. See European Report No. 1171, supra note 74, § III, at 5, 6 (reporting results
of U.S.-EC Conference on Agriculture).
77. Id. An additional meeting between COPA and U.S. farming officials convened
immediately prior to the Conference on Agriculture to discuss the growing tension over
the grain trade dispute in particular. Id.
78. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5 & 6, 55-61 U.N.T.S., T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
79. European Report No. 1171, supra note 74, at 6. COPA representatives also




The United States and the European Community ultimately resolved
their long-running dispute over canned fruits on December 4, 1985.
The European Community offered to reduce its support to fruit canners
by twenty-five percent in response to the United States' allegations of
unfair trade practices.3 0 In 1982, the United States lodged an official
complaint with GATT, claiming that European Community aid consti-
tuted illegitimate subsidies. A GATT panel reported its findings
against the European Community in July 1984, inducing EC officials to
agree to a reduction of its support.
The U.S.-EC agreement requires a gradual reduction in processing
assistance to fruit canners over the next few years. No firm date has
been set, however, and the European Community has no intention of
entirely eliminating the aid. The agreement merely requires a reduction
in aid that will reflect the European Community's intention to compen-
sate fruit canners for increased growers' prices. 81
V. UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TEXTILE
TRADE ISSUES
United States Congress passage of the Jenkins Textile and Footwear
Bill on December 3, 1985, alarmed European Community leaders. Al-
though the European Community was not a target of textile import
restrictions in the bill, feared it would have to import the surplus tex-
tiles diverted from United States markets.8 2 President Reagan, consis-
tent with his commitment to a free trade policy, lessened the European
Community's fears when he vetoed the Jenkins Bill on December 17th,
1985. ss
ner that would avoid disruption of world commodity markets.
80. European Information Service, EEC-U.S.: Canned Fruit Solution Raises
Hopes of Citrus Settlement, European Report No. 1182, § V, at 1 (Dec. 7, 1985)
(available in the European Community Delegation Library, Washington D.C.). The
European Community claimed the support was intended to assist canners in meeting
increasing growers' prices. The United States rejected that claim and regarded the aid
as responsible for excluding U.S. canners from EC markets.
81. The EC only reduced support to peach canners but refused to alter processing
support to pear canners. Id.
82. European Information Service, Textiles: EEC Keeps Fingers Crossed For A
Presidential Veto on U.S. Textile Bill, European Report No. 1176, § V, at 7 (Nov. 16,
1985) (available in the European Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.).
83. European Information Service, Textiles: Reagan Must Veto US. Textile and
Footwear Bill, Says De Clercq, European Report No. 1182, § V, at 4 (Dec. 7. 1985)
(available in the European Community Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.). United
States sources fully expected that President Reagan would veto the protectionist legis-
lation, as his international trade policy is predominately anti-protectionist.
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The impact of United States government action in this matter ex-
tends beyond U.S.-EC textile trade relations. The Multifibres Arrange-
ment (MFA),84 that governs eighty percent of international textile
trade, is due to expire in July 1986. In December 1985, a conference
was held in Brussels focusing on the form of the renewed MFA. This
conference attracted over one hundred representatives from textile and
clothing industries, as well as consumer groups, foreign trade associa-
tions, and the European Community Commission.
The EC Commission's completion of detailed proposals for its negoti-
ating position in the MFA renewal talks exemplifies the importance of
these concerns to Community members. President Reagan's veto of the
Textile Bill should help to increase cooperation between the United
States and the European Community and should have positive effects
on the future of international textile trading.
VI. INFRINGEMENTS UPON COMMUNITY LAW: A
GROWING PROBLEM FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Infringements of community law within the European Community
are currently a major concern of the European Parliament.8 The num-
ber of infringements is increasing and the Parliament has requested a
Commission investigation into the reasons for this disturbing phenome-
non.86 The European Parliament emphasizes the need for strict and
uniform application of Community laws. It is no longer acceptable that
some Member States try to evade the compulsion of Community laws
by establishing barriers to its application. 7 A review of the annual re-
ports for 1983 and 1984 regarding the monitoring and application of
Community law reaffirmed the Parliament's assertion that national
laws in each Member State must be brought into line with Community
84. European Information Service, Textiles: Future of the MFA Discussed at
CEPS Conference in Brussels, European Report No. 1183, § V, at 8 (Dec. 11, 1985)
(available in the European Community Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.).
85. See European Information Service, Community Law: European Parliament
Calls For More Severity on Member States' Infringements, European Report No.
1169, § I, at 1 (Oct..23, 1985) (available in the European Community Delegation
Library, Washington, D.C.) (focusing on the European Parliament's concern regarding
frequent infringements).
86. Id. The investigation will have legal experts designated to execute an increasing
number of spot checks and improve the penalty system for infringements of the Treaty
by Member States. Id.
87. Id. The Parliament calls for strict adherence to Community laws by all Mem-
ber States as an essential prerequisite for European integration. This precludes certain
protectionist means of escaping adherence to Community law and suggests that individ-
ual states may enforce their rights under Community law through national courts. Id.
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law to unify and strengthen the European Community as a whole.88 In
order to enforce the uniform application of Community laws more ef-
fectively, however, the penalty system against offending Member States
must be improved.
VII. GATT NEW ROUND PREPARATIONS
The European Community will participate as a member of GATT in
the New Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Member states of
GATT agree that the procedures and the overall effectiveness of GATT
must be reviewed and reformed.89 Members are calling for a more flex-
ible trade structure to accommodate new factors and developments in
the international trade system.
Several meetings were convened to resolve disputes blocking the
launching of the New Round of multilateral trade negotiations. A ma-
jor issue in contention was the liberalization of trade in services. A
group of nations led by Brazil and India continued to oppose the inclu-
sion of trade in services in the New Round discussions. Those nations
maintained that the inclusion of trade in services will injure their own
infant service sectors by exposing them to "merciless competition" from
the United States and other trade giants.90 Proponents argue that the
inclusion of services in GATT is fundamental to the proper and effec-
tive functioning of the international trade system. The two opposing




89. See European Information Service, GATT: Senior Officials Fail to Agree on
Report on Preparation for New Round, European Report No. 1177. § V. at 5 (Nov.
20, 1985) (available in the European Community Delegation Library. Washington,
D.C.) (discussing United States threats to seek new trade agreements outside of GATT
unless progress is made toward a new round of negotiations). The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade was originally part of the United Nations Havana Charter. Id.
Although the Charter was never ratified, GATT was adopted a; a system of rules gov-
erning international trade. Id. Since its adoption in 1957, however, many new factors
have entered the international trading system. Agreements betwveen Member States
have outgrown GATT's ability to solve current problems in international trade. There-
fore, Member States agree that material changes must be made to renovate GATT and
make it effective in present-day trade negotiations. Id.
90. Brazil, India, Yugoslavia, Argentina, and Egypt claim that GATT is only capa-
ble of dealing with trade in products. European Information Service. GATT. Start of
New Negotiations Set for Autumn 1986, European Report No. 1180. § V. at II (Nov.
30, 1985) (available in the European Community Delegation Library, Washington,
D.C.).
91. Id. The United States has threatened to boycott GATT in its trade agreements
unless a compromise is reached soon. The European Community has posed itself as a
mediator between the United States and Member States who oppose the inclusion of
services in GATT.
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The Forty-first Session of the GATT contracting parties convened in
Geneva, Switzerland, on November 25, 1985. Chairman Felipe
Jaramillo described the deteriorating condition of the international
trade system, the system's marked movement away from liberal trade
policies that facilitated economic growth between 1950 and 1973,"2 and
the present trend toward protectionist measures, subsidies and man-
aged trade. Jaramillo discussed a bi-annual Report by the GATT Sec-
retariat which contained evidence that ninety-four export restraint
agreements had been negotiated outside of GATT, covering steel, ma-
chine tools, textiles, agricultural products, and various other traded
items.98 The Report also cites new instances of agricultural export sub-
sidy programs, subsidized export credits, and the general problems en-
countered in dispute settlements in GATT. These factors are evidence
of the decaying relationship between economic growth and the growth
of trade in the European Community."
Chairman Jaramillo claimed that GATT has been undermined in re-
cent years by a combination of ill-advised policy measures and a lack of
confidence in GATT's ability to solve problems effectively in the inter-
national trade system.95 To begin rectifying the recent impairment of
GATT, a Preparatory Committee was designated to draft a series of
recommendations to form the basis of a Ministerial Conference in Sep-
tember 1986.
The GATT contracting parties agreed that questions of rollback,
standstill, treatment of developing countries and trade in services are
important and the Committee should consider these questions in their
deliberations. 6 The Conference will officially launch the New Round of
GATT negotiations.
92. Opening Statement by the Chairman Ambassador Felise Jaramillo, 41st Sess.
of the GATT Contracting Parties, reprinted in GATT Press Release No. 1376 2 (Nov.
25, 1985).
93. See id. at 4 (citing a bi-annual Report from the GATT Secretariat on develop-
ments in the trading system).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2-4.
96. European Information Service, GATT: Start of New Negotiations Set for Au-
tumn 1986, European Report No. 1180, § V, at 12 (Nov. 30, 1985) (available in the
European Community Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.). "Rollback" is a dis-
mantling of all existing protectionist legislation, generally by industrialized countries.
"Standstill" is a restraint on new protectionist measures. An exchange of issues at the
New Round is plausible and would engender cooperation among negotiating Member
States. Developing nations may be willing to soften their staunch opposition to the
inclusion of services in GATT, if the United States, the EC and other industrialized




The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) resolved two im-
portant issues during 1985's final months. In late October 1985, the
Council of Ministers agreed to tie EC steel production more closely to
market forces following years of extensive quotas, fixed prices, and sub-
sidies. Soon after, in early December 1985, EC Steel Ministers also
ratified a new comprehensive steel agreement with the United States.
1. Slow Movement Back to a Free Market
The signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 creating the ECSC began
years of rapid expansion for the European steel industry which peaked
during the early 1970's. 97 After the first "oil shock" in 1973, however,
steel production fell, partially recovered, and then dropped again in
1980.98 Thereafter, ECSC production continued to decline, falling 30%
below 1974 figures by 1983.19
Steel production's precipitous decline gradually provoked a profound
change in ECSC policies. Since its inception, the ECSC has concen-
trated on providing a framework for increasing steel production and
removing intra-community trade restraints. 00 Although the ECSC re-
tained regulatory powers along with crisis management authority, it
limited its intervention in the steel sector to precluding certain car-
tels.101 When production began declining during the mid-1970's the
97. See generally Tsoukalis & Strauss, Crisis and Adjustment in European Steel:
Beyond Laissez Faire, 23 COMMON MKT. STUD. 207, 208 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Tsoukalis & Strauss] (assessing the ECSC's response to the present steel crisis). For
example, steel production in the six member countries during that period increased
from 42 million tons in 1952 to 73 million tons in 1960 and 109 million tons in 1970.
Id. at 209; see Co!iMtssION OF EUROPEAN COMuNrrItEs DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR
INFORMATION, THE EUROPEAN STEEL POLICY (1985) (available in the European Com-
munities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.) (providing a quasi-official view of the
EC's response to the steel crisis).
98. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 209. Steel production for the nine
ECSC Member States declined from 156 million tons in 1974 to 126 million tons dur-
ing the following year. Id. Following some fluctuations, steel production rose again to
140 million tons in 1979 only to drop to 128 million tons in 1980. Id. at 209-10
(rounded figures derived from chart).
99. Id. at 209. In that year, ECSC steel production stood at 110 million tons. See
id. at 210 (providing unrounded figures in a chart).
100. Id. at 214.
101. Id. at 215. Under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, cartels are prohibited unless
they contribute to increased efficiency without harming competition. Treaty Establish-
ing the European Steel and Coal Community, Apr. 18, 1951, art. 65, 261 U.N.T.S.
140 (1957), reprinted in OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMt-
MUNITIES, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1978) [hereinafter
cited as ECSC Treaty].
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ECSC first reacted slowly to what was perceived as a merely cyclical
downturn. 10 2 Rather than acting decisively, the ECSC confined its ini-
tial response to monitoring prices and fostering industry cooperation. 03
As production continued falling, however, the ECSC finally realized
that European steel faced a serious structural crises.0 Accordingly,
the ECSC changed its focus toward regulating the market and promot-
ing orderly industry restructuring'0 "using the following devices:
(1) Quotas: After voluntary quotas promulgated in 1977 collapsed
during the 1980 recession, the Council of Ministers declared a "mani-
fest crisis" under Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty. 06 Under this provi-
sion, the ECSC imposed mandatory production quotas on most steel
products through 1985.1
17
(2) Price Controls: Starting in 1977, the ECSC published voluntary
price guidelines of set minimum prices on a wide variety of steel
products.108
(3) Import Controls: Since 1978, the ECSC has negotiated a series
of "voluntary" trade restriction agreements with countries exporting
steel to Europe. 09
102. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 215.
103. Id. at 215. In 1975, the ECSC introduced a system of warning signals, known
as "clignotants," to indicate whether future action should be taken. Id. at 215. In 1975,
the ECSC strengthened the "clignotants" system and published non-mandatory mini-
mum prices. Id. at 216. During that same year, the ECSC fostered the formation of
Eurofer, the European Association of Iron and Steel Producing Industries, a cartel con-
trolling ninety percent of total ECSC production. Id. at 216. Presumably, this cartel
was compatible with ECSC Treaty Article 65. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 101, at
art. 65 (prohibiting cartels).
104. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 219.
105. See generally THE EUROPEAN STEEL POLICY, supra note 97, at 7-11 (explain-
ing ECSC response to steel crises). These measures were christened the Davignon Plan,
in honor of the EC Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, Etienne Davignon; Tsoukalis
& Strauss, supra note 97, at 216 (explaining the Davignon Plan); Du Mesnil, The
Policy Makers, EUROPE, Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 20 (giving a biographical profile of
Davignon).
106. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 216-18; see also ECSC Treaty, supra
note 101, art. 58 (citing the applicable treaty provision).
107. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 218.
108. Id. at 216, 218. Under this system, mandatory prices were imposed whenever
voluntary controls proved ineffective. Id. at 217.
109. Id. at 217, 219. Recently, the Council empowered the Commission to renego-
tiate "voluntary" trade restriction agreements with the EC's trading partners.
European Information Service, Steel: Renewal of Trade Agreements with Third Coun-
tries, European Report No. 1184, § V, at 11 (Dec. 14, 1985) (available in the Euro-
pean Communities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.). In 1985-1986 fourteen
countries were involved in these discussions: Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Po-
land, Romania, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Finland, South Africa, South Korea, Brazil,
Japan, and Australia. Id. As of March 1986 agreements only remained to be concluded
with Brazil, South Korea and Australia. European Information Service, Steel: Conclu-
sion of Agreements Between E.C.S.C. and Third Countries, European Report No.
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(4) Restructuring Aid: Although the ECSC Treaty of Paris pre-
cludes state aid,110 the ECSC authorized such aid under E.C. Treaty of
Rome Articles 92 and 93.111 As a precondition for this derogation, the
Commission retained the authority to tie this aid to a restructuring
plan.112 The plan eventually called for a thirty to thirty-five million ton
cut in capacity 1 to be completed when aids were to be phased out in
1985.114 Moreover, the ECSC contributed its own European Currency
Unit (ECU) loans for industry and grants for job creation and retrain-
ing in depressed areas. 1 5
As the 1985 expiration date for these measures approached, the Eu-
ropean steel industry reached its goal of trimming between thirty and
thirty-five million tons of capacity. 1 " Plant utilization also climbed to
70 percent from 57 percent in 1983.117 Nevertheless, the long-range
outlook for steel still remains gloomy. According to analysts, at least
twenty million more tons of capacity must be slashed in order to reach
an acceptable plant utilization rates of 80 percent.118
In light of this data, the Commission in July 1985 outlined its plan
for a gradual transition back to the free market.11 0 Due to continued
pessimism, the Commission did not suggest an immediate return to-
ward competition. Rather, the Commission advocated a two-step pro-
cess extending for three years.1 20 During the initial eighteen to twenty-
1205, § V, at 10 (Mar. 8, 1986) (available in the European Communities Delegation
Library, Washington, D.C.).
110. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 222; see also ECSC Treaty, supra note
101, at art. 4 (citing applicable treaty provision).
111. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 222; see also Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 92-93, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958),
reprinted in OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CO.IMUNITIES,
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1978).
112. THE EUROPEAN STEEL POLICY, supra note 97, at 9.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 10. By such loans and grants, the ECSC hoped to soften the social and
economic impact of the steel crisis. Id.
116. The Future of Steel in the E.C., EUROPE, Sept.-OcL 1985, at 47.
117. Agence Internationale D'Information Pour La Presse, Steel Council: Having
Noted Differences of Opinion Both As Regards to Subsidies and Liberalization. Min-
isters Will Have to Continue their Debates on Post 1985 Arrangements, European
Report No. 4186, at 8, (Oct. 12, 1985) [hereinafter cited as European Report No.
4186] (available in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.,
File No. 443.2).
118. Agence Internationale D'Information Pour La Presse, Steel: European Com-
mission Proposes Three Year Transitional Regime Following Expiry of Code of Aids,
Before Abandoning Steel Industry to Market Laws, European Report No. 4133, at 5
(July 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Europe, No. 4133] (available in the European
Communities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C., File No. 443.2).
119. The Future of Steel in the E.C., supra note 116, at 47.
120. Id.
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four months, the Commission sought to drop production quotas on four
products: galvanized sheet, coated flat products, concrete reinforced
bars, and wire rod.12' A system of target price arrangements would
replace minimum compulsory prices. 22 Afterwards, only minimum
constraints would continue before completely returning to the free mar-
ket.123 Nevertheless, power to reimpose price controls would remain12 4
and import restraining agreements would be retained. 2 ' Aid would be
encouraged only for grants devoted in part to fund research, develop-
ment and environmental protection, or in some cases, to cover plant
closure costs.
126
After the Commission submitted its plan to the Council, specific as-
pects drew criticism. It soon became evident that strong support existed
for retaining more extensive quotas. 2 7 Some members even argued for
leaving the present system unchanged for a few months or a year. 2
8
Moreover, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (FRG) registered dissent on allowing continued closure
aid. 2 9 Accordingly, the Council modified the Commission's plans.
As approved by EC Steel Ministers, the new plan abandoned quotas
on only two products, coated sheet steel and concrete reinforcing bars,
as of January 1, 1986.10 Although the Council rejected the Commis-
121. European Report No. 4186, supra note 116, at 8.
122. Agence Internationale D'Information Pour La Presse, Steel: Commission
Adopts Two Communications to the Council on Market Organization and Aid Provi-
sions After 31 December, European Report No. 4170, at 7 (Sept. 26, 1985) (available
in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C., File No. 443.2).
123. The Future of Steel in the E.C., supra note 116, at 47.
124. European Report No. 4133, supra note 118, at 6.
125. Id.; see also European Report No. 1184, supra note 109 (listing nations with
whom the ECSC is negotiating voluntary restraints).
126. The Future of Steel in the E.C., supra note 116, at 47.
127. European Report No. 4186, supra note 117, at 8. According to this source,
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Great Britain
opposed dropping quotas for galvanized sheet metal. Id. The FRG, Belgium, and Great
Britain expressed reservations on eliminating quotas for other coated flat products. Id.
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Great Britain argued against ending quotas on con-
crete reinforcing bars. Id. The FRG, Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg, and
Great Britain expressed reservations about terminating quotas for wire rod. Id.
128. European Information Service, Steel: Slow Liberalization of the European
Community Steel Market, European Report No. 1172, § I1l, at 4 (Nov. 1, 1985)
(available in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.). But
see European Report No. 4186, supra note 117, at 8 (naming Belgium as the only hold
out).
129. European Report No. 4186, supra note 117, at 8.
130. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 340) 5, 8 (1985) (providing the official text); see
also European Communities Spokesman's Service, Commission Decisions on Steel Pol-
icy After 1985, Information No. P-100, Nov. 1985 [hereinafter cited as Commission
Decisions] (available in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washington,
D.C., File No. 443.2) (providing a summary of the ESCS's new steel plan). These
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sion's recommendation that quotas on galvanized sheet and wire rod
should be dropped,13 1 the Council ordered the Commission to under-
take a market analysis before the end of 1986 to determine whether
additional quotas should be lifted. 132 In a related move, the Council
removed the Commission's authority to award supplementary quotas to
firms achieving 85 percent of required restructuring.'3 3 Nevertheless,
the Commission retains some discretion to modify individual quotas
should a firm incur severe losses. 3 The Council did grant the Commis-
sion the power to reimpose controls should crisis conditions return.13 5
The production controls system will expire on December 31, 1987.130
Although the Council modified the Commission's proposals on quo-
tas, the proposed limitations on aid remain intact. As of January 1,
1986, Member State aid will be banned under Article 4 of the ECSC
Treaty with three narrow exceptions available through December 31,
1988.137 First, ECSC countries may underwrite up to 35 percent of ba-
sic research and 25 percent of applied research for national indus-
tries.138 Second, Member States may contribute up to 15 percent of
investment costs directly associated with environmental protection.'"
Finally, despite some resistance,1 0 the EC Steel Ministers approved
continued plant closure aid.14 1 Besides subsidizing 50 percent of social
costs, such as early retirement for workers, member countries may also
reimburse firms for their plant closure costs within clearly defined
limits.142
2. ECSC-U.S. Trade
One of the greatest problems facing ECSC planners has been access
provisions will not apply to Spain or Portugal. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 340) 7, 15
(1985).
131. European Report No. 1172, supra note 128, at 4.
132. Id.; see also 28 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 340) 5, 15 (1985) (providing official
text).
133. 28 0.3. EUR. ComM. (No. L 340) 6, 13-14 (1985); see also European Report
No. 1172, supra note 128, at 5 (explaining the Council's decision to modify the Com-
mission's powers to award supplementary quotas).
134. 28 0.3. EUR. COMM. (No. L 340) 6, 13 (1985).
135. Id. at 14.
136. Id. at 15.
137. See id. at 1-4 (providing official text of ESCS agreement on aid); see also
European Report No. 1172, supra note 128, at 2-3 (summarizing aid agreement);
ESCS Treaty, supra note 101, at art. 4 (citing appropriate treaty provision).
138. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 340) 2-3 (1985).
139. Id. at 3.
140. European Report No. 4186, supra note 117, at 8.
141. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 340) 3 (1985).
142. Id.
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to the American market. In 1982 the United States and the EC as-
sumed a 1982 voluntary import restriction agreement 143 hoping to pro-
vide an orderly framework for trade. Events, however, proved this as-
sumption erroneous. Accordingly, negotiators from both sides worked
toward a more comprehensible understanding during 1985.
Despite the 1982 agreement, brinkmanship characterized relations
between both trading partners. In July 1983, the United States unilat-
erally imposed tariffs and quotas on specialty steel, thereby provoking
EC countermeasures against unrelated American products.4 Although
President Reagan thereafter rejected an International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) recommendation for quotas on steel imports exceeding 70
percent, 145 he aggressively pursued new "voluntary" restraint agree-
ments for products not covered under the 1982 accord.240 As a result,
U.S.-EC trade relations remained in a constant state of turmoil.
a. Steel Pipe
Although the ITC found that steel pipe and tube imports had not
injured United States industry, 147  President Reagan specifically
targeted such imports for voluntary restraints. 148 In 1982, the EC
pledged to try to limit exports in this category to 5.9 percent of the
U.S. market.' 49 By the first nine months of 1984, however, exports
surged to 14 percent for the U.S. market. 150 In response, President
Reagan threatened an embargo on further shipments until the year's
end under authority granted him by the Trade Act of 1984.1'1
143. See 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 307) (1982) (providing official text of agree-
ment); Pope, The European Steel Quotas: A Necessary Reprieve or a Pitfall for
American Steel?, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 337 (1983) (criticizing protectionist aspects
of agreement).
144. European Community Information Service, E.C. Announces Countermeasures
for U.S. Specialty Steel Import Restrictions, 3 European Community News (Jan. 13,
1984) (available in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.,
File No. 443.2). In particular, the EC increased tariffs and established import quotas
for certain chemicals, plastics, alarm devices and sporting goods made in the United
States. Id.
145. Reagan Seeks Cut in Steel Imports Through Accords, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1984, at 1, col. 6. See ITC Finds Injury on Several Steel Products, Oil Country Tubu-
lar Goods Cases May Be Filed, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 1112 (BNA) (July 13, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as ITC Finds Injury] (discussing the ITC's recommendations).
146. See Reagan Seeks Cut in Steel Imports Through Accords, supra note 49, at I
(outlining the President's "get-tough" policy).
147. ITC Finds Injury, supra note 145, at 1112.
148. Reagan Seeks Cut in Steel Imports Through Accords, supra note 145.
149. Import Ban on E.E.C. Steel Pipe, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1984, § 4, at 9, col.
6.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 805, 98 Stat.
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In response to this pressure, EC negotiators tentatively agreed to
limit their exports to 7.6 percent of the American market, with some
exceptions.15 2 Unfortunately, despite an initially favorable response, the
Reagan Administration backed away from the agreement following
lobbying from American steel makers.153 On November 29, 1984, the
Customs Service began enforcing an embargo that was set to run until
January 1, 1985. T1 Thereafter, the Administration pledged to hold
steel pipe and tube imports to the 1982 target of 5.9 percent.' 51
As imported pipe began piling up in bonded warehouses,15 the EC
retaliated by terminating the 1982 exchange of letters incorporating
the 5.9 percent cap. 157 While EC officials argued the letter only author-
ized consultations, not unilateral American action, the EC maintained
the letter's abrogation precluded the Americans from enforcing its
terms.158 Using this same argument, European steel importers sought
to enjoin the Custom Service's actions reasoning that the President
lacked authority to enforce a nonexistent agreement.109 Meanwhile, the
EC contemplated retaliation against American farm goods and further
recourse under GATT.160
After the Court of International Trade denied the importers' injunc-
tion request in late November 1984,111 tensions subsided. In January
1985, the EC and United States agreed by an exchange of letters to
limit pipe and tube imports to 7.6 percent of the American market dur-
ing 1985 and 1986.162 Within this overall percentage, imports of Oil
2948, 3045 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2253) (citing the applicable statutory
provisions).
152. Import Ban on E.E.C. Steel Pipe, supra note 149. In particular, the tentative
agreement excluded mill-to-mill contracts already signed but not delivered. Id.
153. U.S. Rejects Common Market Proposal to Limit Shipments of Steel Pipe
and Tube, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1984, at 62, col. 1. American steelmakers objected to
the plan arguing that its terms were too generous and allowed too many exceptions. Id.
154. U.S. Embargoes European Steel Pipe. Tube, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1984, at
D1, col. 3.
155. U.S. Rejects Common Market Proposal to Limit Shipments of Steel Pipe
and Tube, supra note 153, at 62.
156. U.S. Importers Fail to Block Embargo on European Steel, Wall St. J., Dec.
3, 1984, at 30, col. 3.
157. European Community Information Service, E.C. Terminates Exchange of
Letters on Pipes and Tubes in Response to U.S. Unilateral Restrictions, European
Community News, No. 35/1984] (Nov. 27, 1984) [hereinafter cited as EC Terminates
Exchange] (available in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washington,
D.C., File No. 443.2) .
158. Id.
159. U.S. Importers Fail to Block Embargo on European Steel. supra note 156.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 9) 2 (1985) (providing official text of the
agreement).
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Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) could not exceed 10 percent of
American demand. 1 3 Moreover, the EC could only exceed these figures
in the event of a "shortfall" when American producers could not meet
demand.1 64 Under a compromise reached in March, of the 200,000 tons
of warehoused steel involved, 135,850 metric tons were charged against
the EC's 1985 quota while 73,150 metric tons were apportioned to the
1986 quota.'
6 5
The OCTG and shortfall provisions provoked an additional dispute.
Following the March agreement, the EC sought an additional excep-
tion under the shortfall provision for 320,000 tons of German and
French OCTG already consigned to the "All-American" pipeline pro-
ject. 66 Luckily, both sides narrowly averted a crisis when the United
States finally agreed to accept 100,000 additional tons of OCTG. 67 In
return, the Europeans committed themselves to negotiate further in
other areas.'8
b. Consultation Products Including Semi-finished Steel
In partial return for accepting 100,000 tons of OCTG, the EC
agreed to negotiate formal limits on "consultation products."'' 9 Al-
though such products were not subject to mandatory quotas, the 1983
accords empowered the United States to call for consultations in the
event imports of these goods surged beyond normal levels.17 0 The
United States first exercised this right in February 1985, when the
Reagan Administration called for a consultation on semi-finished
goods. 171 Eventually, American concerns that the European manufac-
turers were avoiding voluntary limits on products formally covered in
the 1982 accords by increasing exports of consultation products 17 2 led
163. Id.
164. Id. at 3.
165. U.S. Will Release European Steel Held in Embargo Last Fall, Wall St. J.,
March 5, 1985, at 5, col. 3.
166. Progress on Imports of Oil Pipe, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 3;
E.C. Accepts Terms of Deal to End Trade Dispute, Consultation Talks Set, 6 INT'L
TRADE REP. 784 (BNA) (June 12, 1985) [hereinafter cited as EC Accepts Terms]; see
Schiller and Symonds, Goodyear Pipeline Brawl with U.S. Steelmakers, Business
Week, Apr. 22, 1985, at 42 (repeating an account of the corporate wrangling between
Goodyear, the pipeline builder, and American Steel Producers).
167. Progress on Imports of Oil Pipe, supra note 166.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See U.S. Asks Talks on Exports of Semi-finished Steel, Wash. Post, Feb. 10,
1984. at G2, col. 1.
171. Id.
172. E.C. Accepts Terms, supra note 166, at 784.
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to tense negotiations with threats from both sides. 17 Nevertheless,
neither side wanted a repetition of the pipe fiasco. After the United
States allowed one negotiating deadline to pass, talks were intensified
17 4
and an agreement was finally reached.' 5 In early August 1985, the
Council of Ministers ratified a pact which placed limits on eleven cate-
gories of steel, but which ultimately left the semi-finished steel
problems unresolved. 17' Thus, the way was open for renegotiating the
1982 accord.
c. Renegotiating the 1982 Accord
The EC also agreed to begin discussions on extending the 1982 ac-
cord in return for the OCTG compromise.17 When discussions began
in September 1985, both sides consistently disagreed in two areas.
While the EC wanted two-year import limits, 7 8 with no provisions on
semi-finished steel, 17 the United States desired a four-year agreement
including semi-finished goods.'80 As an October 31, 1985 deadline
neared, the United States threatened an embargo.181 None, however,
was necessary. On November 1, 1985, United States and EC negotia-
tors reached an accord limiting EC exports to 5.5 percent of the Amer-
ican market. 82 While the Americans received a four-year agreement
featuring far more extensive product coverage than in 1982, EC negoti-
ators were able to exclude semi-finished steel which remained a consul-
tation product. 83
Despite this apparent success, last-minute opposition from German
173. U.S.-E.C. Unable to Resolve Consultation Dispute. Now Face Aug. I Dead-
line, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. 926 (BNA) (July 17, 1985).
174. Id.
175. Steel Agreement Reached, EUROPE, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 48.
176. Id.; see 28 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 215) 2 (1985) (printing official text).
177. E.C. Accepts Terms, supra note 166, at 784.
178. European Communities Delegation, U.S.-E.C. Open Steel Negotiations, A
Letter From Europe: A Monthly Update on the European Community From its Dele-
gation in Washington 2 (Oct. 20, 1985) [hereinafter cited as US.-E.C. Open Steel
Negotiations] (available in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washing-
ton, D.C.).
179. European Community Information Service, European Community News No.
40/1985] (Dec. 10, 1985) [hereinafter cited as E.C. Approves New Steel Pact] (re-
porting adoption of European position) (available in the European Communities Dele-
gation Library, Washington, D.C., File No. 443.2).
180. U.S.-E.C. Open Steel Negotiations, supra note 178.
181. U.S. Threatens Embargo on European Steel, Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1985 at
Al, col. 1.
182. U.S.-E.C. Settle Tiff on Steel Limits, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1985 at G I, col. 5.
28 O.J. EUR. Comth. (No. L 355) (1985).
183. U.S.-E.C. Settle Tiff on Steel Limits, supra note 182.
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and British steelmakers, apprehensive about their continued ability to
supply American partners with pipe and semi-finished steel, respec-
tively, nearly derailed the agreement. 184 While transfers between quota
categories for pipe placated the FRG,185 British opposition remained
intractable. 18 6 Although the accord exempted semi-finished goods, a
unilateral American decision to limit imports in this category led Brit-
ish Steel to express concern about its contract with Tuscaloosa Steel,
an American affiliate. 187 As a result, the United Kingdom threatened to
veto the entire agreement until this problem was resolved. 188 Although
this last minute dispute led to American threats and even a temporary
United States embargo of semi-finished goods,'89 eventually the United
States assured the British that Tuscaloosa would be able to import
200,000 tons of British semi-finished steel through 1989.190 Britain then
lifted its opposition, and on December 10, 1985, the Council of Minis-
ters approved the new comprehensive steel agreement with the United
States. " "
As ratified by EC Steel Ministers, the new arrangement, set to run
through September 30, 1989, restricts thirty-three product catego-
ries. "'92 Besides ten products restricted in 1982 and eleven "consulta-
tion" products listed in August, 1985, the new agreement extends quo-
tas to ten additional goods for the first time.'93 Previously, five of these
184. Id.
185. European Information Service, E.E.C.-U.S.: U.S. Remains Firm on Terms of
Steel Accord, European Report No. 1179, § V, at 9 (Nov. 27, 1985) (available in the
European Communities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.).





190. European Information Service, E.E.C.-U.S.: Steel Pact Gets Go Ahead, Euro-
pean Report No. 1182, § V, at 3-4 (Dec. 7, 1985) (available in the European Commu-
nities Delegation Library, Washington, D.C.).
191. E.C. Approves New Steel Pact, supra note 179. Despite the Anglo-American
understanding, semi-finished steel remains a flash-point for U.S.-E.C. trade relations.
See European Information Service, E.E.C./U.S.: European Commission Wants Higher
Quotas for Semi-finished Goods, European Report No. 1187, § V, at 2-3 (Jan. 4,
1986) (available in the European Communities Delegation Library, Washington,
D.C.). On January 1, 1986, the U.S. announced that it had fixed an annual target of
600,000 tons for ESCS semi-finished steel imports. Id. at 2. Because EC exports have
been running at 900,000 tons annually, the Commission is seeking an annual quota of
at least 800,000 tons. Id. at 3. But see U.S. Steel Move Provokes E.C. Retaliation,
EUROPE, Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 42 (stating that exports were running at 800,000 tons
annually). As a result of the U.S. action, the EC has retaliated by cutting back imports
of American fertilizers, coated paper and animal fats. Id.
192. 28 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 355) 3 (1985); see also E.C. Approves New Steel
Pact, supra note 191 (explaining the new agreement).
193. E.C. Approves New Steel Pact, supra note 191. In the 1982 agreement, the
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newly covered products were subject to quotas and tariffs unilaterally
imposed in 1983 under section 201 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.104
Finally, the new arrangement also extends the January, 1985 agree-
ment on steel pipes and tubes to September 30, 1986.105
VII. Recent Developments Demonstrate ESCS Viability
Despite criticism, the ESCS's handling of the steel crisis and trade
disputes with the United States demonstrates the Community's utility
and viability. Had the ECSC not existed, European steel would cer-
tainly be in more dire straits. Though proponents of a free market
might argue that continued "transitional arrangements" threaten per-
manent ESCS interventionism, 19 6 the alternative, a series of ad hoc
measures by national governments, would certainly be worseYa1 More-
over, while the United States has forced the ESCS into a series of "vol-
untary" export agreements, the ESCS enabled Europeans to present a
common front.198 Consequently, the European Steel Manufacturing
Community has benefited from the better coordination and negotiating




EC limited exports of ten steel products to 5.46 percent of the U.S. market. Id. The
new agreement increases the quota to 5.57 percent of the market. Id. Under the new
arrangement, the market share of the eleven consultation products will remain at 3.77
percent of the market. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Crack the Cartel, THE ECONOMIST MAG., July 20, 1985, at 14.
197. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 225; see also Steel Support Scheme
Will be Dismantled, EUROPE, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 42 (citing a positive appraisal of the
ECSC's handling of the steel crisis).
198. Tsoukalis & Strauss, supra note 97, at 225.
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